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(2013) 13 (1) Human Rights Law Review, 25 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The existence of a right of access to government information is increasingly accepted 
around the world, both at domestic and international levels.  At domestic level, a right to 
information is to be found in a growing number of constitutions and since the early 1990s 
there has been a huge upsurge in the number of states adopting Freedom of Information 
laws.
1 
Internationally the existence of a right of access to information is frequently 
articulated in international human rights documents; the first ever international 
Convention on access to information
2 
has been adopted; and human rights enforcement 
bodies, both regional and global, have interpreted existing human rights treaties as 
protecting a right to information in a range of contexts. 
 
The focus of this article will be on the recognition of a right to information at 
international level. The right to information has been most commonly recognized by 
international human rights treaty bodies as coming within the scope of the right to 
freedom of expression though such bodies have, on occasion, based their recognition of a 
 
 
* Professor of Law, University College Cork, Ireland. 
1 Vluegels,   ‘Overview   of   all   FOI   Laws’   Fringe   Special,   9   October   2011,   available   at: 
http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/laws-1/ati-laws_fringe-special_roger-vleugels_2011-oct 
[last  accessed  10  December  2012];  Ackerman  and  Sandoval-Ballesteros,  ‘The  Global  Explosion  of 
Freedom of Information Laws’ (2006) 58 Administrative Law Review 85. 
2 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents 2009, ETS 205. The Convention on 
Access to Official Documents will enter into force when ratified by ten states; to date it has been ratified by 
six and signed by a further eight. 
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right to information on the enjoyment of other rights such as: the right to respect for 
private life; the right to a fair trial; the right to life; social and economic rights; and the 
right to take part in public affairs. One of the themes explored in this article is that of the 
implications of the adoption by the treaty monitoring bodies of an instrumentalist 
approach to the recognition of the right to information. The development of a right to 
information in the context of the realization of other rights will be considered and the 
article will argue that basing the recognition of a right to information on the furtherance 
of other rights may operate to limit the development of the right to information and may 
even have negative connotations in terms of the enjoyment of such other rights. 
 
The article will commence with a brief discussion of instrumentalism in the 
context of rights recognition. It will proceed in Part 2 by tracing the development of a 
right to information in international human rights law. Part 3 of the article will evaluate 
the scope of the right to information as it has evolved in international human rights law. 
Part 4 of the article will advocate the recognition of the right to information as an 
intrinsic right. 
 
1. Instrumental and intrinsic rights 
Nagel describes the instrumental account of rights as postulating that rights are morally 
deriative from other more fundamental values: the good of happiness, self-realization, 
knowledge and freedom and the evils of misery, ignorance, repression and cruelty.
3 
On 
this account, rights are of vital importance as a means of fostering those goods or 
preventing those evils but they are not themselves fundamental. Instrumentalism is 
associated with a utilitarian approach to rights which focuses on maximizing overall 
happiness
4 
and which has been criticised as not paying sufficient attention to individuals. 
Rawls, for example, was of the view that ‘utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons’.5 Opponents of the instrumental view of rights similarly 
argue that it cannot plausibly account for the strength of individual rights. Nagel, for 
example, contrasts the instrumental account of rights with the intrinsic one where rights 
are a ‘non deriative and fundamental element of morality’6 that embody a form of 
recognition of the value of each individual that ‘supplements and differs in kind from the 
form that leads us to value the overall increase of human happiness and the eradication of 
misery’.7 The intrinsic view of rights is therefore associated with individualism.8 Kamm 
suggests that intrinsically valuable rights are status-based while utilitarian rights are 
interest-based.
9  
The significance of the two approaches is described by Wenar as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Nagel, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’ (1995) 24 Philosophy & Public Affairs 83 at 86. 
4 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morality and Legislation (London, 1789); and Stuart Mill, 
Utliitarianism (London, 1863). 
5 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 27. 
6 Nagel, supra n 3 at 87. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Kamm,‘Rights’, in Coleman and Shapiro (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 508 at 508-9. 
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The two views thus approach rights from opposite directions. A status-based 
justification begins with the nature of the rightholder and arrives immediately at 
the right, with only a brief nod to the negative effect that respecting the right may 
have on others’ interests. The instrumental approach starts with the desired 
consequences (like maximum utility) and works backwards to see which right- 
ascriptions will produce those consequences. 
10
 
 
Various theorists have analysed the right to freedom of expression in terms of the 
instrumental versus intrinsic approach to the recognition of rights.
11 
The intrinsic 
approach to rights views freedom of expression as content-neutral. Thus Wenar describes 
Nagel’s account of speech rights as flowing immediately from ‘the nature of persons as 
reasoners, and not from the interests that people may have in speaking on particular 
topics or in lisening to others speak on particular topics’ 12 An instrumental account of 
speech rights, on the other hand, will be unlikely to be content neutral ‘as people have 
very different interests in speaking and in hearing speech on different topics’.13 
 
While Wenar acknowledges the shortcomings of the instrumental approach in 
coming to terms with individual rights, he leans more towards an instrumental account of 
the right to freeedom of expression. To Wenar, the status approach, ‘though resonant with 
our deep intuitions about human dignity, often appears unable to match the subtlety of 
our reasoning about rights’.14 Wenar proffers as an example of such subtlety of reasoning 
the drawing of distinctions between public and private figures in the context of freedom 
of expression, a distinction which cannot, he argues, be accommodated within an intrinsic 
status-based account of rights. Nagel, on the other hand, favours the intrinsic account of 
the right to free speech on the basis that freedom of expression confers a form of 
inviolability on everyone, ‘not as an effect but in itself-in virtue of its normative essence, 
so to speak’.15 This approach, he suggests ‘becomes important if we wish to extend the 
justification of free expression substantially beyond the domain of political advocacy, 
where its instrumental value is clearest.’16 
 
2. The right to information in international human rights law 
 
Until the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Access to Official Documents
17 
in 2009, international human rights instruments did not afford explicit protection to the 
right to information. While the recognition of a right to information in international 
human rights law was also slow to evolve, international human rights bodies such as the 
UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American 
 
 
10 Wenar, ‘The Value of Rights’, in O’Rourke (ed.), Law and Social Justice (Boston: MIT, 2005) 179 at 
181. 
11 See Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000) at 24. 
12 Wenar, supra n 10 at 183. 
13 Ibid. at 184. 
14 Ibid. at 187. 
15 Nagel, supra n 3 at 96. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, supra n 2. 
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Court of Human Rights and the European Committee on Social Rights have today 
accepted the existence of a right to information in certain circumstances. This has 
invariably occurred in the context of the securing of other rights, including both civil and 
political and economic and social. Each of these foundations for the right to information 
will be considered below with a view to building an overview of the current status of the 
right to information in international human rights law. 
 
A. The right to freedom of expression 
Perhaps the most broadly based of the rights that have been relied upon as the foundation 
for a right to information is the right to freedom of expression. Every international human 
rights treaty protects this right.
18 
Traditionally, the focus of the right to freedom of 
expression had been on the provider of information. As Weeramantry explains, 
‘Libertarian or liberalist theories … concentrate on the rights of the speaker’.19 The right 
to information, on the other hand, has at its core the potential recipient of that 
information. The foundation of the argument for including a right to information under 
the umbrella of freedom of expression is that access to information is a pre-condition of 
the full exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
20 
Crucially such information 
includes not only that which the provider wishes to furnish to the recipient, but also 
information that others, such as the government, do not wish to make available to them. 
The right to information can therefore be said to be instrumental to the enjoyment of the 
right to freedom of expression or, as expressed more colourfully by Judge Bell of the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in XYZ v Victoria Police: ‘Freedom of 
information is in the blood which runs in the veins of freedom of expression’.21 
Freedom of expression and freedom of information have long been linked in 
international human rights activities and documentation. The reports of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Freedom of Expression have supported the 
recognition of a right to freedom of information within the framework of the right to 
freedom of expression in the ICCPR. The 1998 report referred to the right to seek, 
receive and impart information in Article 19 as imposing ‘a positive obligation on states 
to ensure access to information, particularly with regard to information held by 
governments’. Subsequent reports of the Special Rapporteur have endorsed the view that 
Article 19 of the ICCPR encompasses a right of access to information. For example, the 
2005 Report of the Special Rapporteur stated: 
Although international standards establish only a general right to freedom of 
information, the right of access to information, especially information held by 
public bodies, is easily deduced from the expression ‘to seek [and] receive … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Article 19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR); Article 13 American 
Convention on Human Rights; Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950, ETS 5; and Article 9 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
19 Weeramantry, ‘Access to Information: A New Human Right. The Right to Information’ (1994) 4 Asian 
Yearbook of International Law 99 at 103. 
20 Beatson and Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir 
David Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
21 [2010] VCAT 255 (16 March 2010). 
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information’ as contained in articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
22
 
 
In 2004, the Special Rapporteur along with the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression of the Organisation of American States and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued a joint declaration recognising the access right as a 
fundamental human right based on the principle of maximum disclosure
23 
and in 2010, 
UNESCO
24 
marked World Press Freedom Day 2010 by issuing the Brisbane Declaration 
which called on national governments who had not already adopted access to information 
laws to do so ‘based on international standards and the principle of maximum 
disclosure’.25 
 
In 2011, in a highly significant development, the UN Human Rights Committee 
published a new General Comment on Article 19 of the ICCPR,
26 
which, in contrast to its 
predecessor,
27 
expressly acknowledged that Article 19 embraces a general right of access 
to information held by public bodies. The General Comment noted, in arriving at this 
position, that Article 19 taken together with Article 25 of the ICCPR, the right to take 
part in public affairs had previously been interpreted by the Committee as including a 
right of the media to access to information on public affairs
28 
and the right of the general 
public to receive media output.
29 
The Committee further noted that elements of the right 
of access to information were addressed elsewhere in the ICCPR. It was pointed out, for 
example, that General Comment No 16 regarding article 17 of the Covenant, the right to 
privacy, addresses the issue of access to and amendment of personal data relating to 
individuals,
30 
while General Comment No 32 regarding Article 14 of the ICCPR, the right 
to a fair trial, sets out the various entitlements to information that are held by those 
accused of a criminal offence.
31 
The Committee also referred to the fact that Article 10, 
the right to liberty, had been interpreted by the Committee as preserving the right of 
prisoners to access their medical records.
32 
Finally, the Committee noted that General 
Comment No 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on the parties to 
 
 
 
22 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, E/CN.4/20.05/64, 2005, at para 39.   See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/11/4, 2009, at para 60. 
23 Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 6 
December 2004. 
24 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 
25 UNESCO, Brisbane Declaration: Freedom of Information, The Right to Know, 3 May 2010. 
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34: Freedom of expression (art 19),12 September 
2011, CCPR/C/GC/34 . 
27 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 10: Freedom of expression (art. 19), 29 June 
1983, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. 
28 Gauthier v Canada (633/1995), CCPR/C/65/D633/1995, 5 May 1999. 
29 Mavlonov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan (1334/2004), CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, 29 April 2009. 
30 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16: The right to respect of privacy, family, home 
and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation (art. 17), 8 April 1988, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. 
31 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32. 
32 Zheludkov v Ukraine (726/1996), CCPR/C/76/D/726/1996 (2002). 
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the Covenant states that persons should, pursuant to Article 2 of the Covenant, be in 
receipt of information regarding their Covenant rights in general.
33
 
 
General Comment No 34 fleshes out the requirements necessary to give effect to 
the right of access to information protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Parties to the 
Covenant should both proactively publish government information of public interest and 
“enact the necessary procedures, whereby one may gain access to information, such as by 
means of freedom of information legislation”. Interestingly the General Comment goes 
into a degree of detail in terms of the contents of such legislation, referring in particular 
to the need to make provision for the timely processing of requests for information, for 
the giving of reasons for refusals of access to information and for the putting in place of 
an appeals system. It also states that fees for requests for information should not be such 
as to constitute an unreasonable impediment to access to information. 
 
Notwithstanding these developments embracing the right to information, 
international human rights courts and monitoring bodies had, for many years, been slow 
to interpret the right to freedom of expression as encompassing a right to information. 
More recent developments indicate a willingness to move towards the recognition of this 
right however, at least in specific contexts. In 1999, the UN Human Rights Committee 
expressed the view in Gauthier v Canada
34 
that Article 19, read together with Article 25 
(the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs), ‘implies that citizens, in particular 
through the media, shall have wide access to information and the opportunity to 
disseminate information and opinions about the activities of elected bodies and their 
members’. This case revolved around the issue of access by the applicant journalist to 
press facilities in the Canadian parliament, rather than the issue of access to information 
per se. 
 
The 2009 admissability decision of the Human Rights Committee in S.B. v 
Kyrgyzstan,
35 
was less encouraging in terms of the recognition of a right to information. 
The applicant was a human rights activist who had requested information concerning the 
pronouncing of death sentences in Kyrgyzstan. The Human Rights Committee noted that 
the applicant had not explained ‘why exactly he, personally, needed the information in 
question’ and that he had merely contended that it was a matter ‘of public interest’. The 
Committee went on to hold that, in light of these circumstances, and ‘in the absence of 
any other pertinent information’, the complaint constituted an actio popularis and was 
therefore inadmissible. 
 
In 2011, the pendulum swung back again in favour of the right to information 
with the decision of the Human Rights Committee in another case emanating from 
Kyrgyzstan, Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan,
36 
the facts of which mirror those of S.B. v 
Kyrgyzstan. The Committee found that the applicant’s Article 19 rights had been violated 
 
 
 
33 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: Nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1. 
34 (633/1995), CCPR/C/65/D633/1995 (1999), at  para 13.4. 
35 (1877/2009), CCPR/C/96/D/1877/2009 (2009), at para 4.2. 
36 (1470/2006), CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 (2011). 
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by the refusal of the Kyrgyzstan authorities to provide him with access to statistics on the 
imposition of death sentences in that jurisdiction. On the issue of admissibility, the 
Committee noted that the information sought had been deemed to be information of 
public interest in a number of UN documents, each of which was either signed or 
accepted by Kyrgyzstan. The Committee went on to say that the reference to the right to 
‘seek’ and ‘receive’ information contained in Article 19(2) included the right of 
individuals to receive State-held information, subject to the exceptions provided for in the 
Covenant. In a clear departure from its approach in S.B. the Committee observed that the 
‘information should be provided without the need to prove direct interest or personal 
involvement in order to obtain it, except in cases in which a legitimate restriction is 
applied’. The Committee sought to distinguish the position in Toktakunov from that in 
S.B. on the basis that the complainant in Toktakunov was a legal consultant of a human 
rights public association, and ‘as such, he can be seen as having a special “watchdog” 
functions [sic] on issues of public interest’.37 In light of the fact that S.B. was a human 
rights activist who, like Toktakunov, sought access to information regarding death 
sentences, this distinction is difficult to sustain. The Committee concluded that the 
complainant was, as an individual member of the public, directly affected by the refusal 
of the authorities to make the information available to him and that the application was 
therefore admissible.38 
 
In terms of the merits of the case, the Committee, having noted that the right of 
access to information includes a right of the media to have access to information on 
public affairs and the right of the general public to receive media output, held that public 
associations or private individuals who are engaged in the exercise of ‘watchdog’ 
functions on matters of legitimate public concern warrant similar protection to that 
afforded to the press in terms of access to State-held information. The Committee 
observed that delivery of information to an individual can permit it to circulate in society, 
so that the latter can become acquainted with it, have access to it, and assess it and 
continued: ‘In this way, the right to freedom of thought and expression includes the 
protection of the right of access to State-held information…’ The Committee concluded 
that the State party had an obligation either to provide the author with the requested 
information or to justify any restrictions of the right to receive State-held information 
under Article 19(3) of the Covenant. The Committee found that none of the restrictions 
permitted under Article 19(3) applied and so Kyrgyzstan was found to be in breach of its 
obligations under that Article.
39
 
At the regional level, an influential milestone in the international development of the 
right of access to information occurred in 2006 when the Inter-American Court of Human 
 
 
 
 
37 Ibid. at para 6.3 . 
38 Ibid. at para 6.5. 
39 Interestingly this decision was not referred to by the Human Rights Committee in explaining the basis of 
its finding in General Comment No 34 that Article 19 includes a right to information.   This may have been 
down to a question of timing.  While the General Comment was formally adopted in September 2011, a 
number of months after the Human Rights Committee had handed down its decision in Toktakunov, it is 
likely that much of the contents of the General Comment had been agreed well in advance of that date. 
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Rights handed down its decision in Claude Reyes v Chile.
40 
The case originated in a 
request for access to information relating to a deforestation project submitted to the 
Chilean Committee on Foreign Investment by an environmental group. The Committee 
provided the applicant with some of the requested information but did not adopt any 
written decision justifying its refusal to disclose the remainder. The failure of the 
Committee to disclose all of the requested information and the lack of written response 
from the Committee were unsuccessfully challenged by the applicant before the domestic 
courts, which deemed his complaints inadmissible. The applicant made a complaint under 
the American Convention on Human Rights arguing inter alia that the failure of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment to disclose all the information he had requested 
amounted to a violation of Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
which protects freedom of expression. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
found that 
 
by expressly stipulating the right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ ‘information,’ Article 13 of 
the Convention protects the right of all individuals to request access to State-held 
information, with the exceptions permitted by the restrictions established in the 
Convention. Consequently, this article protects the right of the individual to receive 
such information and the positive obligation of the State to provide it
41
 
A later decision of the Court, Gomes Lund v Brazil,
42 
extended the scope of the right 
to freedom of expression to contribute to the recognition of a ‘right to truth’ about gross 
human rights violations. The case concerned a challenge to amnesty laws prohibiting 
prosecutions for torture and killings committed during the military dictatorship in Brazil 
in the 1970s. The Court held that law was ‘incompatible with the American Convention 
and void of any legal effects.’ The right to the truth about gross human rights violations 
was held by the Court to be ‘connected to the right to seek and receive information 
enshrined in Article 13’ of the Convention.43  By denying and delaying access by the 
victims’ relatives to relevant army archives and other information, Brazil was held to 
have violated their Article 13 right to information when read together with Articles 8 
(duty to investigate grave violations) and 25 (judicial protection of rights). 
 
The path to recognition by the European Court of Human Rights of a right to 
information as part of the right to freedom of expression has been long and tortuous. 
Some of the earlier decisions of the supervisory bodies of the ECHR had been quite 
expansive  in  their  approach  to  interpreting  the  scope  of  the  right  to  freedom  of 
expression. In 1979 in X v Federal Republic of Germany,
44 
for example, the European 
Commission on Human Rights said: 
 
[I]t  follows  from  the  context  in  which  the  right  to  receive  information  is 
mentioned ... that it envisages first of all access to general sources of information 
 
 
40 Sep-19/2006, IACtHR, Series C 151 (2006).  The Court also found a violation of Article 8 ACHR: see 
the text at n 88 infra. 
41 Ibid. at para 77. 
42 Nov-24/2010 IACtHR, Series C 219 (2010). 
43 See para 201 of the Spanish version of the judgment. 
44 DR 17 (1979) at 227. 
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... the right to receive information may under certain circumstances include a right 
of access by the interested person to documents which although not generally 
accessible are of particular importance.
45
 
 
In the same year, in Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No 1),
46 
a case which concerned a 
challenge to the granting of an injunction by the British courts against the publication of 
an article about the thalidomide scandal, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
Article 10 guarantees not only freedom of the press to inform the public but also ‘the 
right of the public to be properly informed’.47 Later decisions tended however to 
narrowly interpret the scope of the right to freedom of expression as it applies to those 
who seek information. In Leander v Sweden
48 
the applicant complained that his rights had 
been infringed in circumstances where information about him that was recorded in a 
register maintained by the Swedish Security Department was disclosed to a potential 
employer. Believing that he had been denied a position on the basis of that information, 
Leander sought access to the information in order that he might challenge the decision 
not to hire him. In considering his complaint that his Article 10 rights had been violated, 
the court treated the right to receive information as being merely negative in effect 
saying: ‘[T]he right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government 
from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to 
impart to him.’49 The Court went on to hold that ‘Article 10 does not, in circumstances 
such as those of the present case, confer on an individual a right of access to a register 
containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the 
Government to impart such information to the individual.’50 The inclusion by the Court 
of the phrase ‘in circumstances such as those of the present case’ did however leave open 
the possibility that the Court might in the future find in favour of an applicant who sought 
access to government information. 
 
Subsequent decisions of the Court in the 1980s and 1990s did not pursue that 
option however. In Gaskin v United Kingdom
51 
the Court held that Article 10 did not 
embody an obligation on the State concerned to impart to the applicant, information 
contained in records held by a public authority relating to a time when he had been in 
public foster care. In Guerra v Italy,
52 
the Court reiterated its view that the right to 
freedom to receive information in Article 10 basically prohibits a government from 
restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to 
impart to him. The Court held that the freedom to receive information referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention ‘cannot be construed as imposing on a State, 
in circumstances such as those of the present case, positive obligations to collect and 
 
 
45 Ibid. at 228–229. 
46 A 30 (1979); 2 EHRR 245. 
47 Ibid.  at 281. 
48 A 116 (1987); 9 EHRR 433. 
49 Ibid.  at 456. 
50 Ibid. 
51 A 160 (1990); 12 EHRR 36. 
52 1998–I; 26 EHRR 357. 
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disseminate information of its own motion’.53 The decision in Guerra not only confirmed 
the court’s reluctance to allow Article 10 to ground the establishment of a right of access 
to official information, but also restated its opposition to the use of Article 10 to impose 
positive information dissemination obligations on the State, at least in the particular 
circumstances of that case.
54
 
A pivotal issue in the establishment of a right to freedom of information under the 
umbrella of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the ECHR, is the extent to 
which Article 10 can be said to impose positive obligations. While the existence of 
positive obligations under Article 8 had long been recognised,
55 
such obligations had not 
been generally viewed as arising under Article 10, although the decisions in Leander and 
Guerra implicitly acknowledged that this could occur in certain circumstances. A later 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights clearly established that positive 
obligations can derive from the right to freedom of expression as set out in Article 10: in 
Özgür Gündem v Turkey,
56 
the Court held that genuine effective exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression ‘does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but 
may require positive measures of protection’. This left open the possibility that Article 10 
could be interpreted as including a positive right of public access to information. 
 
Following the 2006 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Claude Reyes v Chile,
57 
there was a discernible shift in the approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights to the issue of access to information.  The  first  decision 
indicating a change in attitude was an admissability decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v Czech Republic.58 The applicant, an 
environmental NGO, had requested access to documents relating to the design and 
construction of a nuclear reactor. The Court found that the application was inadmissible 
on the basis of being ‘manifestly ill-founded’ as the authorities had adduced sufficient 
justification for refusing access to the requested documents. The Court did however 
acknowledge that the rejection of the applicant’s request for information amounted to an 
interference with its right to receive information under Article 10. This decision was 
significant in terms of establishing that a refusal of a request for access to information 
can amount to an interference with Article 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Ibid at para 53. 
54 See also Roche v United Kingdom 2005-X; 42 EHRR 599, where the Court held that there was no 
reason not to apply the ‘established jurisprudence’ in Leander, Gaskin and Guerra. See also Sirbu v 
Moldova Applications Nos 73562/01, Admissibility, 15 June 2004, where the Court referred to Leander in 
deeming an application inadmissible under Article 10. 
55 See, for example, Marckx v Belgium A 31 (1979); 2 EHRR 330; and Airey v Ireland A 32 (1979); 2 
EHRR 305. 
56 (2001) 31 EHRR 1082. The Turkish Government was found to be under a positive obligation to take 
investigative and protective measures where the ‘pro-PKK’ newspaper and its journalists and staff had been 
victim to a campaign of violence and intimidation. 
57 Supra n 40. 
58 Application No 19101/03, Admissibility, 10 July 2006. 
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This decision was followed in 2009 by the landmark decision in Társaság a 
Szabadság v Hungary,
59 
where the European Court of Human Rights held, for the first 
time, that a refusal of access to information constituted a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR. The applicant, a civil liberties non-governmental organisation (NGO), employed 
domestic freedom of information (FOI) legislation in a bid to obtain access to the text of 
an application for constitutional review of laws relating to drug offences submitted to the 
Constitutional Court by a member of parliament. The decision of the Constitutional Court 
to refuse to grant access to the requested material had been upheld by the domestic 
courts on the basis that the application for review contained personal data of the member 
of parliament which could not be accessed without the author’s approval. The European 
Court of Human Rights decided that the refusal of access amounted to a violation of the 
applicant’s rights under Article 10. The Court commenced its assessment of the merits of 
the case by asserting that it had ‘consistently recognised that the public has a right to 
receive information of general interest’ and that ‘the law cannot allow arbitrary 
restrictions which may become a form of indirect censorship should the authorities create 
obstacles to the gathering of information’. It went on to say that the NGO, operating as it 
did as a social watchdog, deserved the same protection of its Article 10 rights as the 
press. The Court concluded, on the basis that the applicant’s intention was to contribute 
to a public debate, that the refusal of access amounted to an interference with the 
applicant’s rights under Article 10. This interference was found to be unjustified in that it 
did not meet the requirement of being ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In arriving at 
this conclusion, the Court, referring to its decision in Matky, noted that it had ‘recently 
advanced towards a broader interpretation of the notion of “freedom to receive 
information”[citation omitted] and thereby towards the recognition of a right of access to 
information.’60 
 
Another 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Kenedi v 
Hungary,
61 
again saw the Court hold that a denial of access to information by the State 
amounted to an interference with the right to freedom of expression. The applicant was a 
historian undertaking research into state security service in 1960s. The domestic courts 
had found in favour fo the granting of access to the requested information but the State 
had failed to enforce a court judgment to that effect. The Government conceeded that 
there had been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression and the Court 
agreed saying ‘access to original documentary sources for legitimate historical research 
was an essential element of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression’.62 The Court 
found that as the Ministry had acted in in defiance of domestic law, the interference was 
not  ‘prescribed  by  law’.  This  finding  obviated  the  need  to  examine  whether  the 
interference had a ‘legitimate aim’ or was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and the 
Court concluded that the interference was unjustified.
63
 
 
 
 
 
59 Application No 37374/05, Merits, 14 April 2009. 
60 Ibid. at para 35. 
61 Application No.31475/05, Merits. 26 May 2009. 
62 Ibid. at para 43. 
63 A pending case, Bubon v Russia Application No 3898/09, concerns an attempt by a researcher to obtain 
access to crime statistics. 
12  
In 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed 
the recognition by the Court of a right to information arising under Article 10 when it 
referred in Gillberg v Sweden,
64 
to persons who had requested access to research files 
held by a university, as having rights ‘under Article 10 … to receive information in the 
form of access to the public documents concerned’.65 The facts of this case diverged 
from those of a straightforward access to information scenario, in so far as they related to 
a rejection by the ECtHR of a claim by the head of the department of the university in 
which the requested records were held, that his conviction of a criminal offence for 
refusing to comply with a court order to give access to his research files amounted to a 
violation of his rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. The decision nonetheless 
amounts to an acknowledgement by the Grand Chamber that a right to information can 
arise under Article 10. 
 
B. The right to take part in public affairs 
International human rights instruments contain several provisions designed to promote 
participation in government, for example, the right to take part in public affairs, the right 
to vote and the right to free elections.  Article 25 of the ICCPR supports both 
participatory and representative models of democracy in so far as it protects the right to 
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. Article 25 also protects the right to vote and to be elected, and the right 
of access to the public service. Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(the right to participate in government) protects the right to vote and to take part in public 
affairs in identical terms to Article 25 of the ICCPR. Article 13 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights confers on every citizen a right to ‘participate freely in the 
government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives’. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the original text of the ECHR contained a number of 
references to democracy,
66 
no rights akin to those found in Article 25 ICCPR were 
included in it. The right to free elections was however added by Article 3 of the Protocol 
No 1 to the Convention but there is no right to take part in public affairs in the ECHR. As 
a result, O’Connell describes the provisions of the ECHR on specifically democratic 
rights as being very tentative.
67
 
 
The rationale for recognising a right to information based on the right to take part 
in public affairs is that a well-functioning democracy requires an informed electorate. 
Models of participative democracy, in particular, require that citizens be sufficiently 
well-informed to enable them to effectively participate in government. Stiglitz, for 
example, argues that ‘meaningful participation in democratic processes requires informed 
 
 
 
 
64 Application No 41723/06, Merits, 3 April 2012.. 
65 Ibid. at paras 93 and 94. 
66 For example, the preamble recognises the joint contribution that effective political democracy and 
human rights make to the attainment of ‘those fundamental freedoms, which are the foundation of justice 
and peace in the world’. Also many of the rights contained in the ECHR to which restrictions may be 
applied cannot be restricted more than is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
67 O’Connell, ‘The Right to Democracy’, in Bechter and De Angelis (eds), Problems of Democracy: 
Probing the Boundaries (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010) 48. 
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participants’.68 Florini argues for a right to information deriving from the recognition of 
democratic rights in instrumentalist terms when she says that ‘a broad right of access to 
information is fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of 
representative democracy is informed consent, which requires that information about 
political practices and policies be disclosed’.69 Roberts appears to favour this rationale for 
the recognition of a right to information over one based solely on the right to freedom of 
expression: ‘the logic suggests that the access right is better understood as a corollary of 
basic political participation rights, rather than the right to freedom of expression alone’.70 
He recognises an instrumentalist basis for a right to information in this context when he 
suggests that political participation rights ‘have little meaning if government’s 
information monopoly is not regulated’. 71 
 
The link between access to information and participation in public affairs has also 
been recognised in international human rights jurisprudence. In Gauthier v Canada the 
UN Human Rights Committee relied on Article 25 of the ICCPR, along with the right to 
freedom of expression, in upholding a complaint of a journalist who had been denied 
access to press facilities in parliament.
72   
The basis of the Committee’s decision was that 
‘[c]itizens, in particular through the media, should have wide access to information and 
the opportunity to disseminate information and activities about the activities of elected 
bodies and their members.’73 
 
On the other hand, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in Claude v 
Chile,
74 
deemed inadmissible the applicant’s claim under Article 23 (the right to 
participate in government) that the approval by the Chilean Committee on Foreign 
Investment of a deforestation project to be carried out by a private corporation, related to 
activities of such fundamental public interest as to require access to information in order 
to facilitate direct citizen participation in their oversight. The basis of the Commission’s 
decision was that since Article 23 refers to the right to participate in government either 
directly, or through freely elected representatives, in order to conclude that there had 
been a violation of Article 23 the Commission would have to find, not only that citizens 
were, as a result of the lack of information, unable to participate directly in government 
but also that they were unable to elect their representatives freely. While the Commission 
acknowledged that access to public information about the conduct of individuals who run 
for public office may impede the ability of citizens to elect representatives in a manner 
that can truly be considered ‘free’, it found that the applicants had not made a prima facie 
showing that they have been impeded from freely electing their representatives. Despite 
the restrictive approach to the scope of Article 23 that had been adopted by the Inter- 
 
 
68 Stiglitz ‘The Role of Transparency in Public Life’, in World Bank, The Right to Tell: The Role of the 
Mass Media in Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002) 30. 
69 Florini, ‘Introduction; the battle over Transparency’, in Florini (ed.), The Right to Know: Transparency 
for an Open World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 3. 
70 Roberts, ‘Structural Pluralism and the Right to Know’ (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 
243 at 262. 
71 Ibid. 
72 (633/1995), CCPR/C/65/D633/1995 (1999) at para 13.4. 
73 Ibid. at para 13.4. 
74 Supra n 40. This decision is discussed further in the text to n 40 supra. 
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American Commission in finding this element of the applicant’s claim to be 
inadmissible, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights took account of arguments 
concerning the role played by access to information in promoting participation in arriving 
at its decision in Claude v Chile that the withholding of information amounted to a 
violation of the right to freedom of expression in the American Convention. In particular, 
the Court took into account the fact that the information at issue could ‘permit 
participation in public administration’.75 
 
 
C. The right to respect for private life 
Privacy rights are widely protected in international human rights instruments. For 
example, Article 17 of the ICCPR provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.’ The right to privacy is also protected by most 
regional human rights instruments.
76 
Most of the case law pertaining to the right to 
privacy in international human rights treaties has been generated by the European Court 
of Human Rights. The Court has long held that Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private life, home, family and 
correspondence, can give rise to both positive and negative obligations on States.
77
 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a broad approach to the scope of 
Article 8 in the context of access to information. Article 8 accommodates variations in 
the circumstances in which information is withheld by the State, encompassing both 
information, access to which has been refused, and information that the authorities have 
failed to make available on its own initiative. It also accommodates different categories 
of information, including information that is personal information of the requester, and 
information that the applicant has an interest in accessing, even though it is not personal 
to him or her. Examples of information the refusal of access to which has been found to 
come within the scope of Article 8 include: information relating to a period the applicant 
spent in care as a child;
78 
records held by the security police about the applicant;
79 
and 
medical records.
80 
While the refusal of access to each of these categories of information 
has been found to amount to an interference with Article 8, the Court has held in some 
instances that such refusal was justified in terms of paragraph 2 of Article 8 which allows 
for restrictions on the right to respect for private life that are: in accordance with law; for 
a legitimate aim expressly provided for; and necessary in a democratic society. Thus 
while in Gaskin v United Kingdom,
81 
a refusal on the part of the authorities to allow the 
applicant to access information relating to a period he had spent in care was held to 
amount  to a  violation  of  Article  8, the  Court  held in  Leander v  Sweden
82   
that  the 
 
 
75 Ibid. at para 86. 
76 Article 11 ACHR; Article 6 ECHR; Article 7 European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
There is no right to privacy in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
77 Golder v United Kingdom A 18 (1978); 1 EHRR 524; and Airey v Ireland A 32 (1979); 2 EHRR 305. 
78 See Gaskin v United Kingdom supra n 51; and M.G. v United Kingdom 36 EHRR 3. 
79 Leander v Sweden, supra n 48; see also: Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden 2006-VII; 44 EHRR 2. 
80 K.H. v Slovakia Application No 32881/04, Merits, 28 April 2009. 
81 Supra n 51. 
82 Supra n 48.. 
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applicant’s right to access records held by the security police about him was outweighed 
by the State’s interest in protecting its national security.83 
The decision in Guerra v Italy
84 
provides an example of a situation in which a 
failure, as opposed to a refusal, on the part of the State to provide information gave rise to 
a violation of Article 8. The Court held that Article 8 had been violated as a result of the 
State’s failure to provide them with access to information that would have allowed them 
to assess the risk they might run from living in a town exposed to a severe environmental 
hazard.
85 
Similarly, in McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom,
86 
where the applicants 
were seeking to link their health problems to alleged exposure to radiation during their 
military service, the Court found that the alleged failure of the authorities to allow the 
applicants access to portions of their military medical records and to recordings of 
environmental radiation levels came within the scope of Article 8. The basis of this 
decision was that the documents in question contained information which might have 
assisted the applicants in assessing radiation levels in the areas in which they were 
stationed during the tests, and might have served to reassure them. 
87
 
Most of the information the withholding of which has been held to give rise to a 
violation of Article 8 consists of personal information viz child care records, social 
services records and medical records but the Court has also accepted that a violation of 
the right to respect for private life may arise in the case of the withholding of or failure to 
supply information which is not personal to the applicant, but in which he or she has a 
personal interest in obtaining access. For example, in Guerra v Italy
88 
the information in 
question was not personal information of the requester but consisted instead of 
information that would have allowed the applicants to assess the risk they might run from 
living in a town exposed to a severe environmental hazard
89 
while part of the disputed 
information in McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom
90 
consisted of recordings of 
environmental radiation levels. 
 
D. The right to a fair trial 
The right to a fair trial is a classic civil and political right protected in all the major 
human rights treaties.
91 
Weeramantry had presaged the use of the right to a fair trial to 
form the basis for a right to information in the early 1990s when he described the 
 
 
 
83 See also Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden,supra n 79, where the Court held that there was no violation of 
Article 8 on the basis that that a refusal of access is necessary where the State may legitimately fear that the 
provision of such information may jeopardise the efficacy of a secret surveillance system designed to 
protect national security and to combat terrorism. 
84 Guerra v Italy, supra n 52, where this intereference with the applicants’ Article 8 rights was found to be 
unjustified. 
85 The Court went on to hold that this interference was not justified under the terms of Article 8(2) and 
thus gave rise to a violation of Article 8. 
86 McGinley & Egan v United Kingdom 2000-I; 27 EHRR 1 
87 The Court found however that there was no violation of Article 8 as the State had met its positive 
obligations arising under Article 8 by providing a procedure for applying for the records in question which 
the applicants had not used. 
88 Supra n 52. 
89 See also Roche v United Kingdom 2005-X; 42 EHRR 599. 
90 Supra n 86. 
91 ICCPR: Article 14; ECHR: Article 6; ACHR: Article 8; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Article 7. 
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enjoyment of that right as being ‘dependent on information relating to the charges against 
the accused and the evidence on which they are based’.92 The dependent relationship 
between the right to a fair trial and the right to information was acknowledged by the 
European Court of Human Rights in a civil law context in McGinley & Egan v UK.
93
 
The applicants had complained that as a result of the non-disclosure of portions of their 
military medical records and the records of radiation levels they had been denied 
effective access to a court in violation of the right to a fair trial contained in Article 6 of 
the Convention. The Court accepted that an interference with the right to a fair trial could 
arise out of a restriction on access to information in the following terms: 
if it were the case that the respondent State had, without good cause, prevented 
the applicants from gaining access to, or falsely denied the existence of, 
documents in its possession which would have assisted them in establishing … 
that they had been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, this would have been 
to deny them a fair hearing in violation of Article 6 § 1.
94
 
 
A similar approach was adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Claude Reyes v Chile
95 
where the Court held that the right to a fair trial in the American 
Convention on Human Rights was violated inter alia by the failure of an administrative 
body to justify the withholding of information. As noted, the case originated in a request 
for access to information relating to a deforestation project in respect of which the body 
to which the request was submitted, the Committee on Foreign Investment, did not adopt 
any written decision justifying its refusal to disclose all of the requested information. The 
applicant made a complaint under the American Convention on Human Rights arguing 
inter alia that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention which protects the 
right to a fair trial. The Court found that the Committee’s failure to adopt a ‘duly 
justified’ written decision which would have provided information regarding the reasons 
for the decision not to disclose part of the information and would, in addition, have 
established whether this restriction was compatible with the Convention, resulted in a 
violation of Article 8.
96
 
 
E. The right to life 
The right to life is the most fundamental right of all and it is strongly protected in 
international human rights treaties.
97 
The evolving jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights concerning the positive obligations emanating from Article 2 supports a 
duty on the part of States to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.
98 
In the 
leading decision of Osman v United Kingdom,
99 
the Court said that an interference with 
Article 2 will occur where the authorities know of the existence of a real and immediate 
 
 
92 Weeramantry, supra n 19 at 102. 
93 2000-I; 27 EHRR 1. 
94 In the event, the Court found no violation of Article 6 as the applicants had failed to use a procedure 
available to them for the disclosure of the documents. 
95 Supra n 40. 
96 Ibid. at para 122. 
97 Article 6 ICCPR; Article 2 ECHR; Article 4 ACHR; and Article 4 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. 
98 Osman v United Kingdom 1998-VIII; 29 EHRR 245; and Kilic v Turkey 2000-III; 33 EHRR 1357. 
99 Ibid.. 
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risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third 
party and they fail to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. Measures aimed at safeguarding 
life could include the provision of information to those whose lives are known to be at 
risk. As demonstrated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Oneryildiz v Turkey,
100 
the right to life can also support a right to information in broader 
circumstances than those provided for in Osman. This case concerned a shanty town that 
had been established on a hilltop below a refuse tip. The resposible local authority had 
received an expert report informing them of a very real risk of a build-up of methane at 
the refuse tip and the possibility of a landslide, but had taken no action. Thirty-nine 
people died as a result of a methane explosion which caused a landslide. One of the 
grounds on which the Government was found to have violated the right to life was that it 
was unable to show that any measures were taken to provide the inhabitants with 
information ‘enabling them to assess the risks they might run as a result of the choices 
they had made’.101   Again the violation in question arose out of a failure to supply 
information rather than a refusal to supply it. 
 
 
D. Economic and social rights 
Economic and Social Rights are protected at UN by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and also at regional level.
102 
The link between 
access to information and the realisation of economic and social rights is the subject of 
increasing recognition. A report published by the NGO, Article 19, and entitled ‘Access 
to Information: An Instrumental Right for Empowerment’ asserts that ‘The right to access 
public information about one’s economic, social and cultural rights is not only related to 
these rights – it is a precondition for their realisation’.103 A number of General Comments 
issued by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 
interpretation of the rights protected by the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights have emphasised the importance of access to information in realising 
those rights. For example, the General Comment issued in respect of the right to social 
security requires that social security systems should ‘ensure the right of individuals and 
organizations to seek, receive and impart information on all social security entitlements 
in a clear and transparent manner’.104 
 
The right to information was accepted by the European Committee of Social 
Rights in Maragopoulous Foundation for Human Rights v Greece,
105 
as a necessary 
condition of the enjoyment of specific social and economic rights. The Committee found 
 
 
100 2004-XII; 41 EHRR 325. 
101 Ibid. at para 108. 
102 Europe: European Social Charter; Americas: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: and Africa: African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. 
103 Article 19, Access to Information: An Instrumental Right for Empowerment (London: Article 19, 
2007), at para 8.1. 
104 European Committee on Economic and Social Rights, General Comment No 19: The right to social 
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that the Greek government, in failing to meet its obligations regarding the provision of 
information concerning pollution caused by lignite mining had violated rights protected 
under the European Social Charter. In particular, the Committee found breaches of inter 
alia the right to health (Article 11) and the right to safe and healthy working conditions 
(Article 3). The right to health was said to impose on the Greek government a duty to 
inform and educate the public about environmental problems. By not applying 
satisfactorily the legislation mandating the provision of information to the public about 
the application of environmental criteria in the approval of projects, the government was 
held to have failed to meet its obligations under the right to health (Article 11). The 
Committee also found that the government did not provide sufficiently precise 
information to meet its obligation under Article 11 to develop a valid educational policy 
aimed at persons living in lignite mining areas. With respect to the right to safe and 
healthy working conditions, the Committee found that the state had a duty under Article 3 
to provide precise and plausible explanations and information on occupational accidents 
and on measures taken to monitor the application of the relevant health and safety 
regulations. The government had failed in this obligation inter alia by not supplying 
precise data on the number of accidents in the mining sector. 
 
 
3. Scope of the right to information in international human rights law 
While advocates of the right to information have enthusiastically welcomed recent 
developments in the case law of the Human Rights Committee, the Inter American Court 
of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee on 
Social Rights, the question arises whether these developments, by virtue of their 
primarily instrumental focus, limit the scope of the right to information. In order to be as 
comprehensive as possible a right to information should be unlimited in scope in terms 
of: 
1. The context in which the right may be invoked 
2. The class of requester who may invoke the right 
3. The nature of the information that may be sought 
4. The purpose for which access may be sought 
This list of requirements should not be understood as suggesting that the right to 
information should be absolute. In common with almost all other rights protected by 
international human rights treaties, the right to information may, in certain circumstances, 
be restricted. What is at issue here is the shape of the right to information in advance of 
the imposition of any legitimate restrictions on its operation. A comparison under these 
headings of the right to information, as it has evolved to date from the decisions of the 
international human rights Courts and treaty monitoring bodies, with the right to 
information provided for under the only international human rights instrument to 
expressly guarantee a right of access to information, the Council of Europe Convention 
on Access to Official Documents, clearly demonstrates the shortcomings in the scope of 
the right to information as it has emerged from the jurisprudence of the human rights 
courts and treaty monitoring bodies. 
 
A. The context in which the right may be invoked 
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While the access right provided for in the Convention on Access to Official Documents 
applies in all contexts where information is held by public authorities, the upholding by 
the international human rights bodies of a right to information based on the right to 
respect for private life, the right to a fair trial, the right to life, and economic and social 
rights is clearly context dependent in so far as such rights can deliver a right to 
information in certain circumstances only; for example where the information at issue 
relates to the requester or where the requester has a particular interest in accessing it 
(right to respect for private life); where the information is needed in connection with legal 
proceedings (right to a fair trial); where the information is needed to protect life (right to 
life) or where the information is needed to further economic or social rights, such as the 
right to health. Given the narrow contexts in which these rights can form the basis of a 
right to information, they will not be discussed further in terms of their potential to form 
the basis of a general right to information.The right to take part in public affairs and the 
right to freedom of expression clearly offer a much broader basis for engagement with the 
right to information. These rights will be further compared with the access right provided 
for in the Convention on Access to Official Documents in terms of the other criteria for a 
comprehensive right to information: the class of requester who may invoke the right; the 
nature of the information that may be sought; and the purpose for which access may be 
sought. 
 
B. The class of requester who may invoke the right 
The right of access provided for in the Convention on Access to Official Documents is 
unlimited in terms of the class of requester who can invoke that right in so far as it 
guarantees ‘the right of everyone, without discrimination on any ground, to have 
access’106 to information and requires that ‘requests for access to official documents shall 
be dealt with on an equal basis’.107 The scope of the right to take part in public affairs 
provided for in Article 25 of the ICCPR is, apart from the fact that it is confined to ‘every 
citizen’ as opposed to ‘everyone’, is inclusive. While applicants who have initiated 
proceedings before the Human Rights Committee under Article 25 have invariably had 
some degree of political involvement, for example as political activists, candidates for 
political office or for membership of political parties,
108 
or, in the case of Gauthier, as a 
parliamentary reporter, it is clear that the protection afforded by Article 25 is not 
confined to such groups and the Human Rights Committee has not expressly confined the 
enjoyment of the rights conferred by Article 25 to those involved in political activities. 
The right to freedom of expression in all the major human rights treaties similarly applies 
to ‘everyone’ but the decisions of the treaty bodies have emphasised the watchdog role of 
requesters who invoke the right to freedom of expression in order to gain access to 
information.  In Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan
109 
the basis of the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s decision that the authorities had violated Article 19 was the performance by 
the applicant of ‘‘‘watchdog” functions on matters of legitimate public concern’. This 
decision clearly echoed the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Tarsasag 
 
 
 
106 Article 2(1). 
107 Article 5(3). 
108 A perusal of the cases arising under Article 25 shows that they consist largely of political activists, 
candidates for political office or for membership of political parties. 
109 Supra n 36.. 
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v Hungary
110 
which turned on the fact that the applicant, the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union, was acting as a ‘social watchdog’ though Toktakunov goes further by 
contemplating the performance of such functions by individuals as well as organisations. 
These decisions suggest that while both the right to take part in public affairs and the 
right of freedom of expression appear to apply to all, the right to information that has 
evolved from the right to freedom of expression, in particular, has been associated with 
the fulfilment of a ‘watchdog’ role by the seeker of information. 
 
C. The nature of the information that may be sought 
The right of access provided for in the Convention on Access to Official Documents is 
unlimited in terms of the nature of the information to which it applies in that it covers 
‘information recorded in any form, drawn up or received and held by public 
authorities’.111 The strong emphasis placed by General Comment No 25 on the role of 
public affairs in the conduct of formal political processes suggests that the focus of 
information rights arising under Article 25 of the ICCPR is on the provision of access to 
information that concerns the conduct of political processes.
112 
This is reflected in the 
approach of the UN Human Rights Committee. In Gauthier, for example, the Human 
Rights Committee couched its decision in favour of access in terms of the information at 
issue being information ‘about the activities of elected bodies and their members’. It 
appears therefore that the right to information that has emerged from the right to take part 
in public affairs is limited to information of a political nature. 
 
The scope of the right to information that has developed under the umbrella of the 
right to freedom of expression would also appear to be limited to particular categories of 
information. In the landmark case of Claude Reyes v Chile,
113 
for example, the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights emphasised the public interest aspects of the requested 
information. In particular, the Court noted that the information the State had failed to 
provide was ‘State-held information of public interest’. The European Court of Human 
Rights has also paid attention to the nature of the information to which access has been 
sought. In Tarsasag v Hungary
114 
for example, the Court referred to the fact that the 
information in question was ‘information on a matter of public importance’, while in 
Kenedi v Hungary,
115 
the Court noted that the information at issue consisted of ‘original 
documentary sources’ required for legitimate historical research.  It appears therefore that 
information to which the right to information arising under both the right to take part in 
public affairs and the right to freedom of expression might apply, would have to meet 
some sort of public interest qualitative test. 
 
 
D. The purpose for which access may be sought 
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The access right provided for under the Convention on Access to Official Documents is 
unlimited in terms of the purpose for which access may be sought in so far as no 
requirements as to the reasons why access is sought are imposed by the Convention. The 
irrelevance to the exercise of the right of access of the purpose for which access is sought 
is supported by the inclusion in the Convention of an express prohibition on the 
imposition on requesters of obligations to give reasons for accessing requested 
information.
116   
The decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee regarding Article 25 
of the ICCPR that pertain to access to information have all related to attempts on the part 
of the individuals concerned to participate in political processes of one kind or another, 
for example, to stand for office or to vote
117 
or, in Gauthier’s case, to obtain access to 
parliamentary press facilites.  This suggests that the right to information that arises under 
Article 25 is limited to sitations where access to information is sought in connection with 
participation in political activities, or the dissemination of information concerning such 
activities. This is in keeping with General Comment No 25 issued by the UN Human 
Rights Committee in respect of Article 25 of the ICCPR which refers to the conduct of 
public affairs in the following terms: 
 
The conduct of public affairs … is a broad concept which relates to the exercise 
of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and 
administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public administration, and the 
formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and 
local levels.
118
 
 
The scope of Article 25 in forming the basis of a general right to information was 
also undermined by the interpretation of the equivalent provision of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (Article 23) as requiring evidence of the imposition of an 
impediment on both an individual’s right to participate directly in government and their 
right to freely elect their representatives. While the Commission acknowledged in 
Claude v Chile that ‘[lack of] access to public information about the conduct of 
individuals who run for public office may impede the ability of citizens to elect 
representatives in a manner that can truly be considered “free’’’,119 establishing a link 
between a lack of access to information and interference with the ‘free’ election of 
representatives could prove difficult. 
 
With regard to the right to freedom of expression, the international human rights 
tribunals have taken account in arriving at their decisions of the purposes of access and 
they have, in particular, highlighted the public nature of such purposes. In Claude v 
Chile, for example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights linked the right of access 
to information that derived from the right to freedom of expression with the requesters’ 
objective of using the requested information to ‘assess the commercial, economic and 
social elements of the … project, measure its impact on the environment … and set in 
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motion social control of the conduct of the State bodies that intervene or intervened in the 
development of the project’120 as well as that of monitoring the ‘possible indiscriminate 
felling of indigenous forests in the extreme south of Chile’.121 The European Court of 
Human Rights in Tarsasag v Hungary
122 
emphasised the role of the right of access to 
information in facilitating ‘participation in public debate on matters of legitimate public 
concern’123 while in Kenedi v Hungary,124 the Court took note of the fact that the purpose 
for which the information was sought was the conduct of ‘legitimate historical 
research’125 to enable the requester to publish an ‘objective study’ on the functioning of 
the Hungarian State Security Service.
126 
These decisions suggest that the purpose for 
which access is sought is a factor that is viewed by the international human rights 
tribunals as relevant to the determination as to whether or not there is a right of access to 
the information in question. Such purpose, it would also appear, must be political in 
character or be concerned with monitoring and/or controlling government activities. 
 
E. Consequences of the placing of limitations on the right to information 
It would appear from the foregoing that recognition of a right to information arising from 
both the right to take part in public affairs and the right to freedom of expression is 
limited, both in terms of the nature of the information sought and in terms of the purpose 
for which it is sought. Those who seek access to information to participate in political 
activities or to participate in informed public debate on matters of legitimate public 
concern should be a good position to invoke their right to such information under the 
right to take part in public affairs or the right to freedom of expression, but only if the 
information they seek is information concerning political processes or is of public interest 
and it is sought for purposes that are political in nature or are at least concerned with 
monitoring or exerting other forms of control over government activities. 
 
Limiting the right to information to the realm of political/public interest contexts 
gives rise to both conceptual and practical difficulties. At a conceptual level, such a 
limitation does not sit well with one of the basic principles of information access laws: 
that access rights accrue to everyone, regardless of their capacity to establish any 
particular interest in accessing the requested information,
127 
and that the motive of a 
requester in seeking access to information should therefore be disregarded. This principle 
is expressly protected in domestic FOI legislation in a number of jurisdictions,
128 
while, 
in others, it is supported by decisions of the courts or other enforcement bodies.
129 
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requirement that requests for access to information have a political or public interest 
dimension focuses undue attention on the motives of the requester thus undermining this 
principle. While the use of government information for the purposes of monitoring 
government activities, or, more broadly, for political purposes, constitute important 
justifications for the recognition of a right to information, there are other justifications for 
access. As Weeramantry has pointed out: ‘An examination of the right to information will 
reveal at once that there are numerous facets of this vast topic which range beyond the 
purely political, into the realms of social, economic, cultural and technological 
information.’130 In particular, requesters may wish to use the right to information to 
secure access to information in circumstances where the gaining of access to the 
requested information might not immediately be seen as serving a broad public interest, 
but it is nonetheless of huge significance to the requesters personally and is potentially of 
equal importance to others who may find themselves in a similar position. Such 
circumstances could include requests aimed at assisting requesters to secure their 
entitlements, to obtain access to information that might shed light on grievances they 
harbour, to help to clear their names in the event of allegations having been made against 
them, and to obtain access to information relating to others, such as family members.
131
 
While the use of information rights in this context may be primarily motivated by 
personal concerns, that is not to say that the granting of access to information in such 
circumstances cannot bring benefits to the wider community, for example, through 
enabling individuals to use the information in a way that sets a precedent for the 
treatment of others who find themselves in a similar position. Locating the right to 
information within the orbit of the right to freedom of expression or the right to take part 
in public affairs or any of the other rights that have on occasion yielded a right to 
information in particular circumstances means that many of those who seek information 
for these purposes may fail to meet the threshold for protection of their right to 
information. 
 
Restricting the right to information to the political realm is also at odds with the 
reality of information access practice in terms of the class of requester who may invoke 
the right, the nature of the information that may be sought, and the purpose of access 
requests. Experience with access laws at domestic level shows that requesters are a 
heteregeneous group. While statistics on the categories of requesters are not widely 
available, those that exist reveal that comparatively few FOI users qualify as ‘social 
watchdogs’. A US study showed, for example, that only six per cent of FOI requests 
came from the media while two per cent came from non-profit organisations.
132 
The 
Annual Report of the Scottish Information Commissioner for 2010/2011 revealed that 
just thirteen per cent of requesters fell into a category that might be described as that of a 
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social watchdog
133 
while the corresponding figure for Ireland was eleven per cent.
134 
While a survey undertaken by Hazell, Worthy and Glover suggests that the proportion of 
UK FOI requesters who could be described as social watchdogs would appear to be quite 
high by international standards in so far as thirty-seven per cent of requests were found to 
have emanated from a combination of campaign workers, the media, political parties and 
charities,
135 
more than sixty per cent of UK requesters do not fall into the category of 
‘social watchdog’. 
 
While data on the nature of the information sought and the purpose of access 
requests is similarly scarce, it appears from the few studies that have been undertaken that 
domestic FOI laws are used at least as much for personal or business purposes as for 
political/public interest purposes. Empirical work done by Hazell, Worthy and Glover on 
the use to which FOI laws are put in the UK, for example, showed that the UK FOI Act is 
put to a variety of uses and that it is used ‘as much a tool for “non-political” activity or 
personal activity as it is for political activity’.136 A study of the use of the Irish FOI Act in 
the context of local government revealed that many requests concern matters of 
individual concern to requesters.
137
 
 
A further problem arising from the adoption of an instrumental approach to the 
right to information is that the linking of the right to information with other rights may 
stretch the scope of that right beyond its appropriate limits. Sedley has commented on the 
incongruity of the recognition of a right to information under the umbrella of the right to 
respect for private life (Article 8) of the ECHR in following terms: ‘There is something 
odd about discovering a right to information in the entrails of Article 8, which says 
nothing about information…’.138 In extreme cases, the shoehorning of the right to 
information into other rights may have negative consequences for the right used as the 
basis of the recognition of the right to information. Professor Neuman, in his individual 
concurring opinion in the UN Human Rights Committee decision in Toktakunov v 
Kyrgyzstan, warned that establishing a right of access to government held information 
under the right to freedom of expression could ‘undermine more central aspects of 
freedom of expression’.139 The right of access to government information can, in 
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Neuman’s opinion, tolerate restrictions on its exercise in circumstances where the 
suppression of the right to freedom of expression would not be justified. For example 
access to information might, according to Neuman, be justified on the basis of cost or the 
impairment of government functions. Placing the two rights together, in Neuman’s 
opinion, runs the risk that restrictions that might be appropriate in the context of the 
exercise of the right to information could unjustifiably be imposed in respect of the 
enjoyment of the right to receive information. His core argument is that ‘The traditional 
right to receive information and ideas from a willing speaker should not be diluted by 
subsuming it in the newer right of access to information held by government’. 
 
 
4. Is there an intrinsic right to information? 
In light of the difficulties associated with pursuing the right to information from an 
instrumental perspective, the question arises whether it is appropriate to view the right to 
information as an intrinsic right rather than an instrumental right.  Stiglitz supported the 
existence of an intrinsic right to information when, having acknowledged that greater 
openness could be justified on instrumental grounds as a means to an end, he continued 
‘[b]ut I also believe that greater openness has an intrinsic value. Citizens have a basic 
right to know’. Florini, too, argued that access to information is not only ‘a necessary 
concomitant of the realization of all other rights’ but is also ‘a fundamental human 
right’.140 
 
According to Sen, the recognition of claims as human rights depends on their 
capacity to ‘survive open public scrutiny’. On the basis of this test, it can be argued that 
the right to information meets the requirements for recognition as an intrinsic right.  In 
particular, one can point to the recognition of a stand-alone right to information at 
international level in the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents 
and (in so far as documents of the EU institutions are concerned) at the right of access to 
information in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and, at domestic level, to the 
constitutions of a growing number of jurisdictions which contain a stand-alone right to 
information not dependent on other rights.
141
 
 
One can also point as evidence of the acceptability of the right to information, to 
the role played by access to information in furthering principles that have wide 
acceptance as pre-requisites of democratic societies, namely those of transparency and 
accountability in government. Access to information has been widely linked to the 
achievement of both transparency and accountability. Transparency can be understood as 
‘a means to achieve the end of a more responsive state that more effectively achieves 
democratically agreed-upon ends’.142 While its scope extends beyond access to 
information,
143 
it is clear nonetheless that access to information plays a pivotal role in the 
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achievement of transparency.
144   
In terms of its capacity to enhance accountability, 
Franschett points out that FOI laws ‘can be used for “exposing” wrongdoing or 
highlighting areas of conflict within government, thereby serving the value of 
accountability’  while Bishop suggests that ‘access to information is necessary in order to 
hold governments accountable and to discover and prevent government corruption’.145 
Some FOI laws refer expressly to accountability as being amongst their aims. The New 
Zealand Official Information Act, for example, includes as one of its purposes ‘to 
promote the accountability of Ministers of the Crown and officials’.146 The concept of 
control which is at the core of accountability was highlighted by Curtin who referred to a 
‘general right of access for citizens to public documents as facilitating the citizens’ 
control of the actions and inactions of public bodies’.147 While Bovens also 
acknowledges the role of information rights in enhancing social control and the 
democratic accountability of government, he links access to information to a broader 
conception of citizenship which ‘concern[s] first and foremost the social functioning of 
citizens, not only in relation to the public authorities, but also in their mutual relations 
and their relations with private legal entities’.148 The role of access in facilitating control 
has also been recognised in access to information jurisprudence. In Claude v Chile,
149 
for 
example, the Inter American Court of Human Rights found that lack of access to the 
requested information meant that the applicants were restricted in their abilities to carry 
out ‘social control of public administration’. 
 
While Wenar points out that arguments supporting the existence of an intrinsic 
right cannot, by virtue of the status based nature of such rights, be based on the good 
effects of the recognition of such a right since ‘[i]n a sense the argument is supposed to 
show that the morality that includes rights is already true’,150 it is nonetheless worth 
noting the potential beneficial effects of the recognition of an intrinsic right to 
information. The suggested move away from an instrumental justification for the 
recognition of the right to information towards classifying it as an intrinsic right would 
have a number of advantages. In the first place, it would remove the requirement to link 
the right to information with other existing rights, which, as we have seen can have the 
effect of limiting the scope of the right to information. In particular, the recognition of the 
right to information as an intrinsic right would, as Nagel has suggested in the context of 
his discussion of the right to free speech, address the limitations identified in the 
instrumental approach to the recognition of this right by extending the justification for the 
right to information ‘beyond the domain of political advocacy, where its instrumental 
value is clearest.’151 The content-neutral character of an intrinsic right would also render 
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it a good fit for the right to information, one of the underlying principles of which is that 
access to information should be unlimited in terms of the nature of the information to 
which it applies. Focusing on the right to information as an intrinsic right would also 
address the problem of the failure of instrumentalist approaches to pay sufficient attention 
to individuals who, as we have seen, are frequent invokers of the right to information for 
personal purposes and whose concerns, in any case, often mirror those of other 
individuals. Another advantage of approaching the right to information as an intrinsic 
right is that it would remove the possibility of unforeseen negative consequences for the 
rights to which the right to information might be linked. Realisation of a stand-alone right 
to information would of course depend on the existence of the political will to include 
such a right in the major human rights treaties. The growing recognition of the right to 
information at both domestic and international levels, it is suggested, should render the 
establishment of such a stand-alone right to information difficult to resist. 
